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For nearly six years, Blue Bell Creameries’ management ignored food
safety compliance concerns at all three of the ice cream maker’s manufacturing 
plants.1  These compliance issues eventually culminated in a listeria outbreak, 
a recall of all of the company’s products, and the death of three customers.2 
Shareholders subsequently brought a derivative action seeking to hold the
board of directors liable for failing to implement a system to oversee food 
safety.3  The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Blue Bell was the first
to confront a Caremark claim and determine that the complaint had plead 
sufficient facts to support a claim that the directors were personally liable 
for breaching their oversight duty.4  This striking conclusion was a result 
of horrifying facts, carefully crafted reasoning, and an arguably expansive 
view of oversight liability. 
Part II of this note will give an overview of director oversight liability 
beginning with Caremark, the Chancery Court decision whose name now 
represents the entire category of board oversight claims.  Part III will discuss 
the Blue Bell case in detail.  Part IV will analyze the court’s reasoning and
propose some doctrinal and practical implications of the decision. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Directors owe their corporation both the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty. The directors’ duty of care requires them to act in good faith in 
the best interests of the corporation with the care that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise.5  The common law business judgment rule protects 
1.  Marchand v. Barnhill (Blue Bell), 212 A.3d 805, 811–13 (Del. 2019). 
2. Id. at 813–14. 
3.  Id. at 809, 815–16. 
4. See id. at 824; Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72
VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2024 (2019).  Blue Bell is one of four cases that have reached the 
Delaware Supreme Court directly on a Caremark claim and the only one in which the 
claim was allowed to proceed beyond the pleading stage.  See City of Birmingham Ret. & 
Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 51 (Del. 2017) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal on a 
motion to dismiss because “the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that the directors faced 
a substantial likelihood of personal liability for a Caremark violation”); Wood v. Baum, 
953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008) (affirming a dismissal on a motion to dismiss because 
the complaint did not plead with particularity that the directors knowingly engaged in illegal 
conduct, that there were any red flags before the board, or that “the defendants otherwise 
consciously and in bad faith ignored the improprieties alleged in the complaint”); 
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (affirming a dismissal on a motion to dismiss 
because the board “exercised oversight by relying on periodic reports” and the board 
cannot be held personally liable for failures of employees). 
ODEL US  ORP  CT M  AR SS N5. See, e.g., M B . C . A  § 8.30(a)–(b) (A . B A ’  2016); see 
also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2020) (authorizing corporations with a 
certificate of incorporation to exculpate directors from monetary damage liability for a 
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directors by requiring plaintiffs alleging a breach of the duty of care to 
rebut a presumption of the directors’ good faith.6  Directors may breach
their duty of loyalty to the corporation by acting in their own self-interest 
rather than in the interests of the corporation—by engaging in transactions 
that involve conflicts of interest, self-dealing, or other suspect motivations 
—by willfully violating the law, or by failing to properly monitor or 
oversee the corporation.7 
breach of the duty of care—gross negligence); id. § 141(e) (stating that only directors who 
rely in good faith on corporate books and records or reports from corporate officers or
certain advisors are fully protected against shareholder claims); id. § 145(a) (stating that
only directors who act in good faith are entitled to indemnification of legal expenses). As part
of their duty of care, directors must also refrain from conducting transactions that constitute
corporate waste, a claim which is rare and requires the plaintiff to show that “the exchange
was ‘so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.’” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig. (Disney), 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 
(Del. 2000)). 
6. See, e.g., Disney, 906 A.2d at 52 (“Our law presumes that ‘in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’” 
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm, 746 A.2d 
at 254)); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. (Caremark), 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. 
Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision 
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or 
‘irrational’, provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that 
the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate 
interests.”). 
7. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(considering a violation of the law to be a violation of the duty of loyalty); Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 967 (distinguishing between self-interested transactions and improper monitoring).  
The Caremark court treated the duty to monitor as part of the duty of care as distinguished 
from the duty of loyalty issues mentioned above.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. However, 
later decisions have considered director oversight liability to be a form of a breach of the 
duty of loyalty.  See, e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 (“Although the Caremark decision is 
rightly seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care by directors in monitoring 
their corporations’ compliance with legal standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the 
opinion articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight that requires a showing 
that the directors breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in good 
faith.”); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to 
act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach 
their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”). 
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A. Oversight Liability: Caremark and Its Progeny
1. Caremark
Director oversight liability, the type of liability at issue in Blue Bell, 
owes its roots to the Caremark decision.8 Caremark was a Delaware Court 
of Chancery decision involving a health care company’s compliance with 
laws prohibiting kickbacks for referrals of Medicare and Medicaid patients.9 
Multiple government agencies, including the Department of Justice,
investigated Caremark’s referral practices, eventually leading to multiple 
grand jury indictments and five stockholder derivative actions based on
employee violations of the referral laws.10 Throughout this period, Caremark 
maintained and updated an internal guide to govern employees’ contracts 
with physicians and hospitals, hired outside auditors to review Caremark’s 
compliance policies, and took other measures to assure compliance with 
the law.11  Caremark’s board of directors received information of these measures
through management reports, through meetings called in response to the 
investigations, and through reports received through the board’s Audit and 
Ethics Committee.12  As part of a settlement with federal and state government 
entities, Caremark paid criminal fines and civil damages, but no officers 
or directors were charged.13 
The court addressed the following issue: “what is the board’s responsibility 
with respect to the organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure
that the corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes?”14 
To answer that question, the court turned to the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
1963 decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.15 and 
developments since the Graham decision.16 The court recounted the holding
8. See, e.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 364 (acknowledging that director oversight liability 
claims are often referred to simply as “Caremark claim[s]”).
9.  See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62. 
10. Id. at 962–64. 
11. Id. at 963. 
12. See id. at 963–64. 
13. Id. at 965. The shareholder derivative claims also resulted in a settlement
agreement.  Id. at 966.  Among other guarantees, the settlement agreement required the 
Caremark board to meet semi-annually to discuss changes to healthcare regulations, to 
establish a new committee that meets at least four times a year and reports compliance to 
the board twice a year, and to receive reports from “compliance officers” to the committee twice 
a year.  See id.  The court’s job was to determine whether to approve this settlement.  See id. at 
960. In deciding whether the settlement was fair to both parties and the absent shareholders,
the court had to evaluate the strength of the plaintiffs’ claim and the legal standard governing the 
directors’ obligation to monitor corporate performance.  Id. at 961. 
14. Id. at 968–69. 
15.  188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
16. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969–70.  The court also turned to trends in criminal 
enforcement of corporate compliance, noting recent changes in criminal penalties for 
812
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in Graham: “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”17  Rejecting a
broader interpretation of this holding—“that a corporate board has no 
responsibility to assure that appropriate information and reporting systems 
are established by management”—the Caremark court decided that in the 
modern context, the Graham decision means that “absent grounds to suspect 
deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with 
wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty 
of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”18 The court reached this conclusion 
after considering the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decisions, which 
emphasized the seriousness of the board’s role and the necessity of 
information in the board’s monitoring role.19 
The Caremark court then analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims in light of its
conclusion that 
a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, 
exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, 
render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable
legal standards.20 
The court held that although there was a violation of law by Caremark
employees, the directors’ failure to learn of these violations was not 
a breach of their fiduciary duty because they made a good faith attempt to 
make themselves informed of the relevant facts.21 
violations of health and safety regulations, which created an incentive for corporations to 
“have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to report 
violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take prompt, voluntary 
remedial efforts.”  Id. at 969. 
17. Id. (quoting Graham, 188 A.2d at 130). 
18. Id. at 969–70. 
19. Id. at 970. 
20. Id. at 969. 
21. Id. at 971–72. 
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2. Stone v. Ritter: The Delaware Supreme Court 
Adopts the Caremark Standard 
Stone was the first case after Caremark in which the Delaware Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to directly address director oversight liability.22 
In so doing, the court approved of Caremark’s interpretation of the court’s 
holding in Graham and approved of the standard for director liability
articulated in Caremark.23 The Stone court ultimately articulated the
standard for oversight liability: 
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director 
oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention. In either case,
imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were 
not discharging their fiduciary obligations. Where directors fail to act in the face of 
a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities,
they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in
good faith.24 
Stone involved a bank and its parent company that were liable for fines 
and civil penalties as a result of employee violations of anti-money laundering
regulations.25  Of significance, as part of its assessment of the company’s
compliance procedures, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
determined that the compliance program “‘lacked adequate board and 
management oversight,’ and that ‘reporting to management for the purposes 
of monitoring and oversight of compliance activities was materially 
deficient.’”26  However, an independent auditor found that the company 
had in place several mechanisms to ensure board oversight of anti-money 
laundering compliance, including a Suspicious Activity Oversight Committee 
that met quarterly, an officer and multiple departments in charge of compliance, 
annual presentations by the officer to the board, and board involvement in 
the amendment of compliance policies.27 
The Stone court held that the plaintiffs’ claim for oversight liability 
lacked basis.28  In so holding, the court noted that “a claim that directors
22. See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 726
(2009–2010); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Institutional Control and Corporate Governance, 
2015 BYU L. REV. 985, 992. 
 23. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367–69 (Del. 2006). 
24. Id. at 370 (first citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003);
then citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
25. See id. at 365. 
26. Id. at 366. 
27. Id. at 371–72. 
28. Id. at 373. 
814
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are subject to personal liability for employee failures is ‘possibly the most
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to
win a judgment.’”29  The independent auditor’s report showed that the board 
was involved in setting policies, delegated compliance to employees, and 
relied on periodic reports.30  Therefore, although the employees failed to
properly report compliance issues to the board, the directors could not be 
personally liable for these failures.31 
B. Oversight Liability Today
Stone’s articulation of the test for oversight liability still stands today. 
The Blue Bell court invoked it.32  Directors must consciously disregard 
their duty to act by either failing to implement a reporting system entirely 
or failing to monitor that system.33 
A director’s failure to act in good faith is a necessary component of 
director oversight liability, a point emphasized in Caremark and Stone.34 
The Caremark court held that “only a sustained or systematic failure of 
the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure
a reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”35  The Stone
court approved of this test and noted that it was consistent with the court’s 
29. Id. at 372 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. (Caremark), 698
A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
30. Id. at 372–73. 
31. Id. at 373. 
32. See Marchand v. Barnhill (Blue Bell), 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019) (citing
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370–72).  The Blue Bell court summarized the standard for oversight 
liability by quoting Stone: 
Bad faith is established, under Caremark, when “the directors completely fail to
implement any reporting or information system or controls, or . . . having
implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail to monitor or oversee
its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention.”  In short, to satisfy their duty of loyalty, directors must
make a good faith effort to implement an oversight system and then monitor it. 
Id. at 821 (alteration in original) (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 370).
33. Id. (citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 370–72).
34. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[A] showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described 
in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director oversight liability.”); Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 970 (“[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure 
that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, 
exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a 
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”). 
35. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
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prior decision in Disney.36  In its analysis of situations where directors act 
in bad faith,37 the Disney court gave one example as “where the fiduciary 
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating 
a conscious disregard for his duties,”38 the type of conduct that the Stone
court recognized as a “‘necessary condition’ for director oversight liability.”39 
Therefore, the failure to act in good faith, as emphasized by the Stone court’s 
holding above, is “essential to establish director oversight liability.”40 
As the Delaware Supreme Court itself has noted, claims for director
oversight liability are often unsuccessful and for good reason.41  In addition 
to the good faith requirement, the difficulty in pleading and proving oversight 
liability claims stems from the fact that directors rely heavily on management 
to run the company and are not expected to be directly involved in many 
of the decisions that management makes.42  Having a demanding test,
however, is beneficial to shareholders because it is lenient enough to encourage 
qualified people to serve on the board, yet strong enough to encourage those 
board members to act in the interests of the corporation.43  A stringent pleading
standard also protects directors from liability when they make decisions to 
44 pursue risky investments that ultimately benefit the shareholders.
36. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney), 906 
A.2d 27, 66–67, 67 n.111 (Del. 2006). 
37. There is no meaningful difference between the lack of good faith and the presence
of bad faith in the fiduciary duty of loyalty context, and courts often use them interchangeably.  
See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009) (adopting the 
Stone court’s test for oversight liability and equating lack of good faith with bad faith); 
Disney, 906 A.2d at 62–68 (discussing the difference between bad faith and subjective bad 
faith—intentional or knowing misconduct—but adopting a definition that equates the failure 
to act in good faith with bad faith); Stone, 911 A.2d. at 369–70. 
38. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 
A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)).  As Stone noted, the Disney 
court cited to Caremark approvingly in its analysis of bad faith following this example.  
Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (citing Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 n.111). 
39. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971). 
40. Id. at 370. 
41. See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill (Blue Bell), 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019)
(“Caremark claims are difficult to plead and ultimately to prove out.”); Stone, 911 A.2d 
at 372 (“[A] claim that directors are subject to personal liability for employee failures is 
‘possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to 
win a judgment.’” (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967)); see also Guttman v. Huang, 823 
A.2d 492, 505–06 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“A Caremark claim is a difficult one to prove.”). 
42. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372 (“Delaware courts have recognized that ‘most of
the decisions that a corporation, acting through its human agents, makes are, of course, not 
the subject of director attention.’” (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–68)). 
43. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
44. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
The court called this the “rational acceptance of corporate risk” and emphasized that 
because shareholders can diversity their portfolios, it is in their interest that corporate 
boards are not risk averse, but instead “accept for the corporation the highest risk 
816
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Twenty-three years after the creation of oversight liability by Caremark, 
and thirteen years after the Delaware Supreme Court’s affirmation of the 
prerequisites of oversight liability in Stone, the court addressed and, for 
the first time, allowed to proceed beyond the pleading stage an oversight
liability claim in Blue Bell.45 
III. THE CASE: MARCHAND V. BARNHILL (BLUE BELL)
The Delaware Supreme Court’s en banc decision in Blue Bell involved 
claims against Blue Bell’s management for failing to properly respond to
food safety concerns and against the board for failing to implement a 
reporting system to inform itself of food safety compliance.46  The court 
addressed both counts in turn, but this note focuses only on the case as it 
relates to the allegations against the board.47 
adjusted returns available that are above the firm’s cost of capital.” Id.  However, a 
lower pleading standard, such as negligence, that allows directors to be held derivatively
liable if these risky investments do not work out will discourage directors from taking any
risks in the first place. Id.
 45. Caremark was first decided in 1996, Stone reached the Delaware Supreme Court 
in 2006, and Blue Bell was decided in 2019.  See generally Blue Bell, 212 A.3d 805; Stone, 
911 A.2d 362; Caremark, 698 A.2d 959. 
46. See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 809, 815–16. 
47. While this note does not delve into the court’s analysis of the claim against Blue 
Bell’s management, it does not by doing so disregard this analysis as uninteresting or 
unimportant.  The dismissal of the claim against management relied on whether demand on the 
board would have been futile—“whether a majority of [the b]oard could [not] impartially 
consider a demand.”  Id. at 807–08 (quoting Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-
JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019)). 
Two tests may be used to determine demand futility:
The Aronson test applies to claims involving a contested transaction i.e., where 
it is alleged that the directors made a conscious business decision in breach of 
their fiduciary duties.  That test requires that the plaintiff allege particularized facts
creating a reason to doubt that “(1) the directors are disinterested and independent or
that (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.” . . . The second (Rales) test applies where the 
subject of a derivative suit is not a business decision of the Board but rather a 
violation of the Board’s oversight duties.  The Rales test requires that the plaintiff
allege particularized facts establishing a reason to doubt that “the board of directors
could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment 
in responding to a demand.” 
Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008) (first quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
814 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); then quoting
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993), abrogated in part by Hamilton Partners,
L.P. v. Englard, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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A. Factual Background48  
Blue Bell Creameries USA, Inc. (Blue Bell) is an ice cream manufacturer 
and producer that suffered a deadly listeria outbreak.49  Food safety regulations
at both the federal and state levels require Blue Bell to prevent and monitor 
possible contamination hazards.50  Between 2009 and 2015, multiple 
regulators, including the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
Texas Department of State Health, and Alabama Department of Health, 
as well as independent laboratories, identified contamination concerns at 
all three of Blue Bell’s manufacturing plants.51  Starting in February of 
2015, Blue Bell recalled some of its products following positive test 
results for listeria at one of its facilities and by April had recalled all of its 
products.52  The Center for Disease Control and Prevention identified two 
of Blue Bell’s plants as the cause of a listeria outbreak that killed three 
adults and sickened five others.53  An FDA inspection following the recall 
The issue in Blue Bell was whether one particular board member, W.J. Rankin, would
have been able to act impartially when considering a demand to sue two officers, and the 
court adopted the Rales test to analyze this issue.  Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 808, 818.  The 
court emphasized the role that the Kruse family had played in mentoring and otherwise 
supporting Rankin and his career when deciding that it was fairly inferable that he would 
not have been able to act impartially when deciding whether to sue Paul Kruse.  Id. at  
818–19. 
In deciding so, the court downplayed the significance of Rankin’s decision to vote
against Paul Kruse to separate the CEO and Chairman positions, and emphasized instead
that “the nature of the decision at issue must be considered in determining whether a 
director is independent.” Id. at 819. Citing cases that seem to share this sentiment, the 
court stated that the decision to sue officers is much more serious than the decision to vote
against them. See id. at 819 & n.95.  The notion that director independence is
measured differently depending on the subject matter at issue is interesting in itself.
However, the court’s characterization of Rankin’s vote also raises some questions.  The
court said that Rankin “had voted differently from Paul Kruse on a proposal,” but this 
characterization does not fully encompass the significance of this vote.  Id. at 819.  The
vote had to do with separating the CEO, President, and Chairman of the Board positions 
so that different people held each position rather than Paul Kruse holding each.  Marchand 
v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018),
rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  After this proposal was passed and Paul Kruse threatened to
resign, Rankin was one of only two people that voted against the rest of the board on a
proposal to reunify the positions.  Id. Therefore, the event was much more than Rankin 
voting “differently” than Paul Kruse—he was voting against him on a decision central to 
Paul Kruse’s continued employment with the company. 
48. I summarize the facts as the court stated them; the court relied on “the plaintiff’s
complaint, documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, and the Court of 
Chancery’s opinion based on these same documents.”  Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 809 n.13. 
49. Id. at 807. 
50. Id. at 810. 
51. Id. at 811–14. 
52. Id. at 813–14. 
53. Id. at 814. 
818
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found contamination and compliance issues similar to the ones discovered
in years prior, indicating that Blue Bell had failed to properly address 
years of compliance deficiencies.54  Members of management, including
the CEO and the Vice President of Operations who both sat on Blue Bell’s 
board, were aware of the continuing compliance deficiencies.55  Employee
interviews further supported the contention that management ignored and 
contributed to compliance concerns.56 
During this period, the board was largely unaware and uninformed of 
compliance issues.57  According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the board 
did not have a food safety committee, a process to specifically devote 
board meeting time to food safety issues, or a protocol or expectation of 
reporting by management to the board.58  Board meeting minutes from
2014 do not reflect that the board specifically discussed listeria-related 
issues at the plants; the only references to food safety were general references 
to discussions of plant operations, a good report from the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality, and a positive report from a third-party sanitation 
auditor.59  The first time the board directly discussed the listeria problem
was two days after the first recall in February 2015, when the board received 
information of regulators’ involvement in the recall.60  The board met again, 
two days after an increased recall in March, and adopted a resolution 
encouraging management to solve the problem.61 
B. Procedural History
The Court of Chancery concluded that the plaintiff had failed to properly
allege either claim—against management or the board—and dismissed the 
54. See id. at 814–15. 
55. See id. at 811 (“Paul Kruse, Blue Bell’s President and CEO, and his cousin, Paul
Bridges, were responsible for the three plants Blue Bell operated in Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Alabama. The complaint alleges that, despite being responsible for overseeing plant 
operations, Paul Kruse and Bridges failed to respond to signs of trouble in the run up to 
the listeria outbreak.”); Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 
4657159, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
56. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 815. 
57. Id. at 812–14. 
58. Id. at 813. 
59. Id. at 812–13. 
60. Id. at 813–14. 
61. Id. at 814. 
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complaint.62  As for the Caremark claim, the court analyzed whether the
plaintiff had alleged a claim under either prong of the oversight liability 
test: utter failure to implement any system of controls or conscious failure 
to monitor an implemented system.63  The court found that although the
plaintiff’s argument principally relied on the board’s failure to implement 
a reporting system, the plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts that the 
board “‘utterly’ failed to adopt or implement any reporting and compliance 
systems,” and thus did not plead a valid claim under the first prong.64 Rather,
the court concluded that what the plaintiff “really attempts to challenge is 
not the existence of monitoring and reporting controls, but the effectiveness of 
monitoring and reporting controls in particular instances.”65 The court 
also found that the plaintiff did not plead a claim under the second prong 
because the plaintiff failed to allege that the board acted in bad faith by 
knowing of and consciously ignoring red flags; the plaintiff did not even 
allege that the board was aware of any red flags.66 
C. Analysis and Conclusion
The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that “the complaint alleges 
particularized facts that support a reasonable inference that the Blue Bell
board failed to implement any system to monitor Blue Bell’s food safety
performance or compliance” and that the “board’s ‘utter failure to attempt
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists’ is an act
of bad faith in breach of the duty of loyalty.”67  The court summarized its 
reasoning as follows: 
62. Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). The court also explained why a 
heightened pleading standard applied in this case.  When stockholders bring derivative suits on 
behalf of a corporation, such as this one, they must make a demand on that corporation’s board 
to pursue the claim or show that such a demand would be futile and should be excused.  
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a); Marchand, 2018 WL 4657159, at *11 (citing Beam v. Stewart, 
845 A.2d 1040, 1044 (Del. 2004)).  When plaintiffs choose the latter, they must meet 
“stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ substantially from the 
permissive notice pleadings” that are normally permitted at this stage in litigation.  Marchand, 
2018 WL 4657159, at *11 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000)).  The 
analysis of demand futility thus leads to an analysis of the merits of the claim. 
63. Marchand, 2018 WL 4657159, at *16 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006)). 
64. Id. at *17–18. 
65. Id. at *18. 
66. Id. at *18–19. 
67. Marchand v. Barnhill (Blue Bell), 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (quoting In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. (Caremark), 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
As a monoline company that makes a single product—ice cream—Blue Bell can
only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products and were confident that its products
were safe to eat.  That is, one of Blue Bell’s central compliance issues is food safety.
Despite this fact, the complaint alleges that Blue Bell’s board had no committee
overseeing food safety, no full board-level process to address food safety issues, 
and no protocol by which the board was expected to be advised of food safety 
reports and developments.  Consistent with this dearth of any board-level effort at
monitoring, the complaint pleads particular facts supporting an inference that
during a crucial period when yellow and red flags about food safety were presented
to management, there was no equivalent reporting to the board and the board was not 
presented with any material information about food safety.  Thus, the complaint 
alleges specific facts that create a reasonable inference that the directors consciously
failed “to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system existed.”68 
In coming to its conclusion, the court emphasized evidence that pointed
to the lack of formal monitoring systems, to management’s failure to report 
to the board, and thus, purportedly, to the nonexistence of an attempt at a 
board-level monitoring system.69  Such evidence included meeting minutes 
and other books and records that, in the court’s view, supported the 
plaintiff’s following allegations: the board did not establish a formal food 
safety committee; no regular schedule or process required management to 
report to the board or required the board to consider food safety risks; 
board minutes did not reflect management’s disclosure of red or yellow 
flags; the board was given favorable, but not negative information about 
food safety; and food safety issues were not regularly discussed at board 
meetings.70  The court also placed weight on the fact that contamination 
compliance failures “might have been rectified had any reasonable reporting 
system that required management to relay food safety information to the 
board on an ongoing basis been in place.”71 
The court followed its mandate to accept the plaintiff’s allegations and 
draw reasonable inferences from them.72  It decided that it was reasonable 
to infer from the facts as alleged in the complaint that the “board has 
undertaken no efforts to make sure it is informed of a compliance issue 
68. Id. at 809 (citing Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971). 
69. Id. at 822. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  This statement by itself exemplifies the court’s contrived reasoning.  See infra
Section IV.A. 
 72. See, e.g., Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 818 (citing Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez,
124 A.3d 1017, 1022 (Del. 2015) (“In that consideration, it cannot be ignored that although 
the plaintiff is bound to plead particularized facts in pleading a derivative complaint, so 
too is the court bound to draw all inferences from those particularized facts in favor of the 
plaintiff, not the defendant, when dismissal of a derivative complaint is sought.”)). 
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intrinsically critical to the company’s business operation.”73 The court went
beyond saying just that the compliance system or the board’s efforts were 
not reasonable; it said “that no board-level system of monitoring or reporting 
on food safety existed.”74  It summarily rejected Blue Bell’s argument that, 
because there was a management-level compliance system in place, it could 
be implied that there was also a board-level monitoring system.75  The fact 
that management regularly reported operational issues to the board was also 
of little significance; the court dismissed this as a general and discretionary 
procedure.76 
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Blue Bell court’s articulation of the standard for oversight liability 
and choice to draw certain inferences from the pleadings confuses the 
existence and effectiveness of a monitoring system, oversimplifies the good
faith inquiry, and emphasizes formalities in place of substantive compliance.
In doing so, the decision sends mixed messages to corporations.
73. Id. at 822. 
74. Id. at 824. 
75. Id. at 823. The court stated: 
At best, Blue Bell’s compliance with these requirements shows only that 
management was following, in a nominal way, certain standard requirements of 
state and federal law.  It does not rationally suggest that the board implemented 
a reporting system to monitor food safety or Blue Bell’s operational performance.  
The mundane reality that Blue Bell is in a highly regulated industry and complied 
with some of the applicable regulations does not foreclose any pleading-stage 
inference that the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of bad faith 
indifference required to state a Caremark claim. 
Id.  Notice that the court described the inference that could be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor
from this evidence in the context of the board’s lack of attentiveness not the board’s efforts to
put a monitoring system in place.  While the industry’s level of regulation, by itself, may not 
have foreclosed the possibility of bad faith, other factors, such as the fact that the board did 
receive reports, only received positive rather than negative reports until it was too late, and
included members that were also officers, were relevant to the determination of whether it 
would be reasonable to infer that the board did not even try to implement a monitoring 
system.  These issues are discussed in infra Part IV. 
This analysis should also be compared to Stone, where the court took notice of the 
board’s involvement in policy manuals and audits as evidence that the board instituted a 
reasonable reporting system.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006); see 
also Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 822–23 (“[T]he company had in place certain manuals for
employees regarding safety practices and commissioned audits from time to time.”).  The
Blue Bell court may not have had the benefit of a third-party report reflecting that the board 
approved policies, delegated compliance, and “exercised oversight by relying on periodic
reports,” but the absence of this information implied only that the board’s involvement was
unknown or ineffective, not nonexistent. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73 (Del. 2006). 
76. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 823–24. 
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A. Does the Monitoring System Need to Be Effective?
Despite its insistence to the contrary, the court conflated a nonexistent 
reporting system with an ineffective one.  The rule articulated by Caremark
and adopted by Stone placed liability on directors who either “(a) utterly
failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or
(b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”77  An ineffective
reporting system, without more, is not a basis for a Caremark claim.78 
However, because the court was constrained by the complaint, which 
alleged that no monitoring system existed,79 it was forced to fit what might 
77. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
78. See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159
at *19 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  “[A]llegations that 
‘there ultimately may have been failures by employees to report deficiencies to the 
Board [provide] no basis for an oversight claim seeking to hold the directors personally 
liable for such failures by the employees.’”  Id. at *19 n.198 (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 
373).  “[A] director cannot be put on ‘inquiry notice by something he or she never saw or 
heard.’”  Id. (quoting In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at 
*2 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2003), aff’d sub nom. Rabinovitz v. Shapiro, 839 A.2d 666 (Del. 
2003)).  “[B]ad faith means ‘the directors were conscious of the fact that they were not 
doing their jobs, and that they ignored red flags indicating misconduct in defiance of their 
duties’ and that it is not enough to plead that ‘some hypothetical, especially zealous, board 
might have discovered and stopped the conduct complained of’ in order to impose 
oversight liability.”  Id. (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, 
No. Civ.A. 1449-N, 2006 WL 391931, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2006), aff’d, 911 A.2d 802 
(Del. 2006)).  The court in In re General Motors “conclud[ed] that the complaint did not 
allege particularized facts showing ‘that the Board had knowledge that General Motors’ 
system was inadequate or that the Board consciously remained uninformed on this issue.’”  
Id. (quoting In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 
3958724, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016)). 
79. See Verified Stockholder Derivative Action Complaint at 2, Marchand v.
Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018) [hereinafter 
Complaint] (“[T]he Board of Directors willfully failed to exercise its fundamental authority and 
duty to govern Company management and establish standards and controls for Company 
compliance, in breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 811 (“[T]he complaint alleges that management 
turned a blind eye to red and yellow flags that were waved in front of it by regulators and 
its own tests, and the board—by failing to implement any system to monitor the company’s 
food safety compliance programs—was unaware of any problems until it was too late.”); 
Marchand, 2018 WL 4657159, at *17–19 (noting that the plaintiff relied primarily on a 
“first prong” theory of liability and that the court was “unable to discern whether Plaintiff 
actually intends to advance a second-prong Caremark claim”).  The complaint repeatedly 
referred to liability based on a “willful failure to govern management” by failing to “establish 
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otherwise have been considered an ineffective system into a box that only 
allowed room for the inference that a monitoring system was completely
nonexistent.
Much of the evidence that the court cited lends more naturally to an 
inference that an ineffective monitoring system was in place rather than 
an inference that no monitoring system existed.  For example, the complaint 
alleged that before the listeria outbreak, management was aware of reports
that should have alerted them to the severity of the compliance issues but 
still failed to report any of this information to the board.80  In fact, during
this period, management reported only positive information about food 
safety to the board and withheld negative reports.81  The board met to discuss
the issue just two days after both the initial product recall and the extended 
recall.82  Together, this evidence lends to a reasonable inference that 
management, in its discretion, chose to withhold concerning information 
from the board until it was unavoidable; it does not necessarily follow that 
the board failed to try to implement a system by which they expected 
management to regularly report this type of information. 
The court also stated that had a reporting system been in place that 
required reports from management at specified time intervals, the consequences 
of the outbreak might have been avoided.83  Notably, these compliance
failures might also have been rectified had management done a better job at 
reporting them to the board. This seems to be more of an observation on 
standards and controls for Company compliance.”  Complaint, supra, at 2, 41. The complaint
alluded vaguely to a “failure of controls” and an “inadequacy of procedures” but attributed the
problem to the board’s support of management and “blatantly evident lack of adequate oversight
and reporting” “despite the obvious existential threat to the Company due to management’s
failure to operate the Company safely.” Id. at 41–42, 47.  Therefore, it appears that the plaintiff
attempted to claim that management’s compliance procedures were ineffective and the board’s
oversight system was nonexistent.  The Appellant’s Opening Brief also made clear that it
was the lack of a board-level system, not its ineffectiveness, that the plaintiff challenged.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 22–23, Marchand v. Barnhill (Blue Bell), 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 
2019) (No. 533,2018). 
80. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 822. 
81. Id.
 82. Id. at 813–14. 
83. Id. at 822.  The statement assumes that a particular result followed because of a
failure of the board, but assuming the opposite—that the same consequence would have resulted 
had the board had a proper monitoring system in place—contradicts this statement’s value.  
Assuming the court had concluded that the board had proper oversight mechanisms in place, 
the board would still have had the same absence of knowledge, and if the board had knowledge 
of the circumstances, the business judgment rule would have applied to any decision the 
board subsequently made.  See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. (Caremark),
698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that a board decision that was allegedly “ill 
advised or ‘negligent’ . . . will typically be subject to review under the director-protective 
business judgment rule, assuming the decision made was the product of a process that 
was either deliberately considered in good faith or was otherwise rational”). 
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the board’s lack of knowledge and its subsequent consequences rather
than on the board’s attempt to acquire knowledge.  The board did not have 
the requisite knowledge either because the board failed to attempt to 
implement a system or because management was ineffective at complying 
with a poorly implemented system, two plausible assumptions that can
reasonably be drawn from a might statement like this. Despite the court’s
mandate that it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it
is a stretch to say that the fact that consequences might have been different, had
the board had a proper system in place, is evidence that the board did not
have a proper system in place.
Some of the court’s reasoning appears to be either a Freudian slip or an
intentional blurring of the distinction made in Stone between the failure to 
implement a system and the conscious failure to monitor one.  In concluding 
that a management-level compliance system was not evidence of a board- 
level monitoring system, the court said that this evidence “does not foreclose
any pleading-stage inference that the directors’ lack of attentiveness rose
to the level of bad faith indifference required to state a Caremark claim.”84 
By using lack of attentiveness as a measure of bad faith, the court contradicted 
its own holding that bad faith lies in the lack of effort in establishing a reporting 
system85 and alluded to a measure of bad faith that is more appropriately used
in conjunction with a failure to oversee—or pay attention to—a reporting 
system already in place.86  It is difficult to imagine how a director can be
inattentive to something that does not exist. 
84. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 823. 
85. See id. at 821 (“[T]he board must make a good faith effort—i.e., try—to put in
place a reasonable board-level system of monitoring and reporting.” (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006))). 
86. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (setting forth the two types of oversight liability).
In fact, at least one lower court interpreting Blue Bell has similarly confused the two types of 
bad faith established by Stone. See Lebanon Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Amerisourcebergen Corp., 
C.A. No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 WL 132752 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020).  As part of
its discussion of director liability stemming from either the failure to implement a 
monitoring system or to oversee such a system, the court cited Blue Bell in support of the 
latter.  Id. at *20–21.  The court quoted a portion of the Blue Bell opinion discussing the 
type of bad faith resulting from failure to implement a monitoring system to explain 
liability for failure to oversee a monitoring system already in place.  See id. at *20 (quoting Blue 
Bell, 212 A.3d at 822).  The full quote from Blue Bell reads: 
[T]he complaint supports an inference that no system of board-level compliance 
monitoring and reporting existed at Blue Bell.  Although Caremark is a tough
standard for plaintiffs to meet, the plaintiff has met it here.  When a plaintiff can 
plead an inference that a board has undertaken no efforts to make sure it is
informed of a compliance issue intrinsically critical to the company’s business 
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Ultimately, the court’s reasoning was contrived to meet its desired end. 
The court at best placed too little weight on, and at worst ignored, the 
significance of evidence that leads to an inference that an ineffective
system existed.  Its reasoning confused nonexistence with ineffectiveness 
and implied that evidence of one can lead to inferences of the other. 
B. Form or Substance: What Matters More to Oversight Liability?
In the eyes of the court, a board may only exemplify its efforts to 
establish a monitoring system by observing formalities.87  The court found
that the complaint alleged that the board did not have a food safety 
committee, a specific portion of board meetings devoted to food safety, or 
an expectation of consistent and mandatory reporting from management.88 
From this, the court inferred that the board “had made no effort at all to 
implement a board-level system of mandatory reporting of any kind.”89 
This emphasis on formalities was not necessarily new.  As the court 
pointed out, “plaintiffs usually lose because they must concede the existence
of board-level systems of monitoring and oversight such as a relevant
committee, a regular protocol requiring board-level reports about the relevant 
risks, or the board’s use of third-party monitors, auditors, or consultants.”90 
Caremark itself involved a board that had a formal ethics committee that 
used outside auditors.91 Stone also involved an oversight committee that
oversaw the particular compliance programs at issue.92 
operation, then that supports an inference that the board has not made the good 
faith effort that Caremark requires. 
Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 822. 
87. See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 809 (“[T]he complaint alleges that Blue Bell’s 
board had no committee overseeing food safety, no full board-level process to address food 
safety issues, and no protocol by which the board was expected to be advised of food safety 
reports and developments.  Consistent with this dearth of any board-level effort at 
monitoring, . . . the complaint alleges specific facts that create a reasonable inference that 
the directors consciously failed ‘to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system existed.’” (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971)). 
88. Id. at 813. 
89. Id.
 90. Id. at 823.  For several examples cited by the court in support of this contention, see
id. at 823 n.112.  Lower courts have adopted this insistence on formalities in the wake 
of the Blue Bell opinion.  See In re Lendingclub Corp. Derivative Litig., C.A. No.  
1298-VCM, 2019 WL 5678578, at *9 n.59 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2019) (acknowledging 
that Plaintiff’s complaint recognized the existence of multiple committees and an independent 
auditor, thereby constituting a formal monitoring system); Rojas v. Ellison, C.A. No. 
2018-0755-AGB, 2019 WL 3408812, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2019) (concluding that the 
board’s audit committee was evidence of a board-level monitoring system). 
91. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 963. 
92.  Stone, 911 A.2d at 371. 
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However, the Blue Bell court gave little credit to the fact that an 
informal equivalent of a committee existed on Blue Bell’s board.  Two 
members of management, Paul Kruse, President and CEO, and Greg 
Bridges, Vice President of Operations, both sat on Blue Bell’s board93 and 
they both “‘provided regular reports regarding Blue Bell operations to 
the . . . Board,’ including reports about audits of Blue Bell’s facilities.”94 
Kruse and Bridges were the two most senior officers responsible for 
company operations and were the two people most responsible for food 
safety compliance.95  A board’s trust in a subset of its directors does not lead
to an inference that the board as a whole acted in bad faith, and reliance 
on two board members intimately involved in operations cannot be reasonably 
seen as the full board taking “no efforts to make sure it is informed of a 
compliance issue intrinsically critical to the company’s business operation.”96 
The court also gave little significance to the fact that the board likely 
expected a certain level of reporting from management on food safety 
issues. It can reasonably be inferred that the board expected management 
to report on food safety regularly, just as the board expected reports on 
operations regularly,97 because food safety was a “compliance issue intrinsically 
critical to the company’s business operation.”98  Based on the same facts, 
the Court of Chancery concluded that there was “consistent reporting by 
93. Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No. 2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).  Richard Dickson, another Blue Bell 
director, also served as sales manager and plant manager of the Oklahoma plant before 
becoming the company’s President in 2017.  Complaint, supra note 79, at 7.  Presumably, 
as a manager involved in plant operations, he also had some knowledge of at least some 
of the compliance issues and had the opportunity to report them to the full board.  However, 
the complaint focused on Kruse and Bridges, who “knowingly disregarded contamination risk 
and safety compliance and continued the Company’s production and distribution of ice 
cream.”  Id. at 39. 
 94. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 817 (quoting Marchand, 2018 WL 4657159, at *17). 
95.  Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 12. 
96.  Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 822. 
97. See id. at 823–24. 
98. Id. at 822 (discussing evidence of board-level efforts regarding “what has to be
one of the most central issues at the company: whether it is ensuring that the only product it 
makes—ice cream—is safe to eat”); see also id. at 824 (discussing food safety as “the 
obviously most central consumer safety and legal compliance issue facing the company”).  The 
court itself even lumped together food safety and operations.  See, e.g., id. at 823 (Blue 
Bell’s compliance with food safety regulations “does not rationally suggest that the board 
implemented a reporting system to monitor food safety or Blue Bell’s operational 
performance.”). 
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senior management to Blue Bell’s board on operations.”99  Therefore, contrary 
to the Delaware Supreme Court’s assertion that “it is inferable that there 
was no expectation of reporting to the board of any kind,”100 the board likely 
reasonably expected Kruse and Bridges to report food safety concerns to 
it as consistently as they reported other operational concerns, especially 
when these two most senior members of management in effect constituted 
a board committee.101 
The court’s insistence on formalities in the context of director oversight
liability downplays the significance that good faith has in the equation.  
When a director’s good faith, and thus their liability, is measured in terms 
of how expensive of a lawyer they hired to organize the board’s structure 
rather than by the substance of their efforts to oversee the corporation, 
good faith loses its significance.  Insistence on formalities has its place in 
corporate law, but a more flexible and realistic standard might be more 
appropriate when dealing with issues that deserve a more deferential touch.102 
99. Id. at 817. 
100. Id. at 813. 
101. The appellant specifically conceded that Kruse and Bridges provided reports to 
the board on a monthly basis yet failed to mention any of the food safety compliance issues.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 35.  Considering that these two members of 
management were aware of the growing compliance concerns for a matter of years, Kruse
and Bridges had ample opportunity to report these issues to the rest of the board.  Their
failure to do so reflected not only on their failures as officers, but also on their failures as board 
members.  Perhaps the real issue was not the board’s failure to designate a committee in charge
of monitoring food safety, but rather its failure to place board members that were not
management on this committee.  The board exercised its discretion in trusting compliance
oversight to the de facto committee, and it was this committee’s ineffectiveness in reporting to
the entire board that kept the board unaware of the compliance issues.  Thus, although a 
de facto committee existed as an oversight mechanism, this committee was simply ineffective. 
102. For example, Delaware rejects the de facto merger doctrine—in which the target 
company’s assets are sold to the acquiring company and then the target company is 
dissolved—and considers the sale and dissolution to be two separate transactions that do 
not require the same protections that a merger would.  See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 
188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).  But see Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 378 (Del. 
1963) (noting that the de facto merger doctrine may be recognized to protect shareholders when 
corporations fail to comply with statutes governing asset sales).  The court recognized that 
Delaware has two separate statutes governing asset sales and mergers that are 
independently significant even if they have the same end result.  Orzeck, 195 A.2d at 378.  
Therefore, a reorganization can proceed under either statute without being governed by 
the requirements of the other.  See id.  In this reorganization context, it is the formalities 
of the reorganization that determine the governing law, so an emphasis on formalities 
is appropriate to ensure certainty and discourage litigation.  See Hariton, 188 A.2d at 125.  
However, in the context of fiduciary duty, where directors are afforded great deference, 
shareholders may be best served by a more flexible standard that allows for a case-by-case 
consideration of good faith. 
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C. How Important Is the Good Faith Inquiry?
What if the court had the opportunity to decide whether the complaint 
sufficiently alleged that the directors consciously failed to oversee a 
monitoring system already implemented?  The court could not point to the 
fact that the monitoring system was ineffective but, instead, would have 
to hold the directors liable by relying on evidence of the directors’ bad 
faith, showing their conscious disregard of their known duty to monitor 
the reporting system.103 The result the court would have reached is obviously
just speculation.  Even so, the court’s analysis was curiously light on evidence 
of the directors’ bad faith, efforts, and intentions.104  The evidence recited 
by the court does not seem to establish that the board, rather than the   
103. See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 808 (“[T]he Court of Chancery reasoned that ‘what 
Plaintiff really attempts to challenge is not the existence of monitoring and reporting 
controls, but the effectiveness of monitoring and reporting controls in particular instances,’ and 
‘this is not a valid theory under . . . Caremark.’” (quoting Marchand v. Barnhill, C.A. No.  
2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), aff’d, 212 A.3d 805 
(Del. 2019))); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (setting forth the two 
mutually exclusive bases for oversight liability).  The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to 
accept the Court of Chancery’s holding that an effectiveness argument was not a valid 
basis for Caremark liability because it cited the lower court’s holding in this respect twice 
without comment.  See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 808, 817.  The court then went on to emphasize 
that it was the existence, not effectiveness, of the reporting system that was in question.  
Id. at 821. 
104. Bad faith was only discussed when the court drew the inference that “the
directors’ lack of attentiveness rose to the level of bad faith indifference” and “that no 
reasonable compliance system and protocols were established.”  Id. at 823–24.  This is 
true despite the fact that the court framed the ultimate issue of the case as “whether the 
complaint pleads facts supporting a reasonable inference that the board did not undertake 
good faith efforts to put a board-level system of monitoring and reporting in place.”  Id. at 
821 (emphasis added).  Perhaps the court was implying that if it can be inferred that the 
reporting system is entirely nonexistent, then it can be inferred that the directors did not 
sufficiently try to put a system in place. 
The complaint relied on alleged evidence of the board’s failure to establish a reporting 
system to monitor management’s food safety compliance and only contained conclusory
allegations that the board “willfully failed to govern management” and establish a system 
of controls.  Complaint, supra note 79, at 40–41.  The main evidence of intent was against Kruse 
and Bridges, members of the board and of management, in their knowing disregard of the risk
of contamination. Id. at 39–40.  However, the complaint alleged the board willfully disregarded
their duties simply by trusting management when there was a reason, unbeknownst 
to the board, not to. See id. at 47.  If the board as a whole was unaware of any of these 
risks and the officer-directors kept the board in the dark of these risks, this fact alone does
not lead to an inference that the board acted knowing that they were disregarding their
duties.  If anything, it just shows that the board was naïve to put their trust in the officer-
directors. 
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officer-directors in charge of compliance, acted in bad faith.105  The 
court also gave little significance to the speediness with which the board 
responded when it received news of the recalls—it met only two days after 
each recall.106  Trusting that other board members with better access to
information would fulfill their fiduciary duty does not “demonstrate[e] a 
conscious disregard for their responsibilities” on the part of the rest of the 
board.107 The board did not ignore any red flags before it and “‘[r]ed flags’
are only useful when they are either waived in one’s face or displayed so that 
they are visible to the careful observer.”108  The officers aware of the red flags
hid them from the board until it was too late, and “[i]n the absence of red 
flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be measured by the directors’ 
actions ‘to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists’ 
and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of employee conduct that 
results in an unintended adverse outcome.”109 And, as previously discussed,
the court ignored allegations in the complaint that lead to an inference that an 
105. It is important to note that a board of directors relies heavily on the officers 
and management to properly report to the board.  Caremark endorsed the proposition that
“absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be 
charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty 
of their dealings on the company’s behalf.”  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig. 
(Caremark), 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Stone also emphasized that when board 
members delegate compliance responsibility to certain employees or departments and then 
rely on periodic reports from those employees, “there is no basis for an oversight claim seeking 
to hold the directors personally liable for” “failures by employees to report deficiencies to 
the Board.”  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).  The Blue Bell court, on the other 
hand, insisted that instead of delegating compliance to management, the board should 
have held “more frequent emergency board meetings to receive constant updates on 
the troubling fact that life-threatening bacteria was found in its products.”  Blue Bell, 212 
A.3d at 814. How exactly was the board supposed to know to hold these board meetings 
when there were no red flags alerting the board to the existence of this bacteria and 
when management only fed the board positive results?  Even after the partial recall when 
the board first became aware of the listeria problems, the board was presumably acting on 
knowledge of the outbreak but not of management’s track record of suppressing compliance 
failures, so trusting management to come up with a proper solution would not have been 
unreasonable. 
Ultimately, it was the discretion placed with Kruse and Bridges that led to Blue Bell’s
demise.  Considering that both were members of the board, it was not just the discretion 
given to management that caused Blue Bell’s downfall, as the plaintiff alleged, but the 
trust given to these two board members.  See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 
35. Therefore, there was evidence that Kruse and Bridges acted in bad faith by 
intentionally withholding compliance issues from the rest of the board, but there was no 
evidence to suggest that the rest of the board acted in bad faith by ignoring any red flags, 
because the potential red flags were withheld from them by those who were most familiar. 
106. See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 813–14. 
107.  See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
108. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2
(Del. Ch. June 5, 2003). 
109. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 373 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971).
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informal reporting system did exist. But because it did not have occasion
to address the issue, the court did not decisively conclude whether there
was any basis for a claim that the Blue Bell directors did not make a good
faith effort to monitor a reporting system that was in place, regardless of how
informal that reporting system was.  A showing of a formal oversight system
should not be necessary to establish good faith even if it is sufficient to do 
so. 
Instead, the court’s decision essentially creates a presumption that directors
act in bad faith whenever it can be inferred that a reporting system did not
exist. The court’s holding nearly said this, but with an eye to the efforts 
of the directors in establishing that system: “When a plaintiff can plead an 
inference that a board has undertaken no efforts to make sure it is informed
of a compliance issue intrinsically critical to the company’s business operation, 
then that supports an inference that the board has not made the good faith 
effort that Caremark requires.”110  The fact that the court’s analysis then turned 
to evidence of an inference of the nonexistence of a monitoring system, 
rather than of director efforts to establish a monitoring system, is what creates 
this presumption.111  The court circumvented the requirement that the plaintiff 
plead lack of good faith—lack of effort—and allowed a complaint that pled 
enough facts for the court to infer that it was possible that a monitoring 
system did not exist to suffice.  More is required; the plaintiff must show 
that the board did not even attempt in good faith to establish that system. 
D. Practical Implications: Changes Companies Can Make to Ensure 
Their Board Has Done Enough to Avoid Liability 
The court makes it clear that a corporation’s adherence to the formalities 
laid out in the opinion is practically determinative of an oversight liability
110. Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 822 (emphasis added). 
111. See, e.g., id. at 809 (“[T]he complaint pleads particular facts supporting an 
inference that during a crucial period when yellow and red flags about food safety were 
presented to management, there was no equivalent reporting to the board and the board 
was not presented with any material information about food safety.  Thus, the complaint 
alleges specific facts that create a reasonable inference that the directors consciously failed 
‘to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system existed.’” (quoting 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971)); id. at 813 (reciting the pleaded facts of an absence of a board 
food safety committee, of a specific portion of meetings devoted to food safety, and of a formal 
protocol of mandatory reports from management, then drawing inferences that the board 
did not expect reporting from management and thus that the board did not make any effort 
to implement mandatory reporting). 
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claim. Corporations should therefore be sure that the board has a committee
that oversees, a board-level process that addresses, and a clear protocol 
for management to report on the companies’ central compliance issues.112 
The board level process should, at the very least biannually, devote a specific
portion of board meeting time to discussing the central compliance issues.113 
The board should also ensure that there is a clear, mandatory requirement 
that management report material compliance developments to the board.114 
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Chancery looked at the same factors highlighted by the 
Supreme Court—a highly regulated industry, ongoing third-party audits
and tests, and management’s reports on operations—and found that a 
board-level monitoring system did exist.  Comparing these two competing
interpretations of the evidence and conclusions about the inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom shows why the plaintiff did not meet the heightened 
burden of pleading particularized facts of bad faith that is necessary to
establish demand futility.115  More information was needed for the courts
to properly characterize the board’s good faith or lack thereof, but the 
pleadings did not supply or even allege this information.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision to allow the litigation to move forward rested 
on reasoning that was entirely one-sided and designed to adapt itself to a 
desirable result.  Ultimately, the court ignored the role of bad faith in an 
oversight liability claim, confused its inference that a monitoring system 
did not exist with injections of evidence that pointed more directly to an 
ineffective system, and measured human intentions by their adherence to 
formalities rather than by the substance of their actions.  Simply put, the 
court was too generous with its inferences and failed to give necessary 
deference to the Blue Bell board before concluding that they had acted in 
bad faith.116 
112. See, e.g., id. at 809, 817, 822–23; In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., 
C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (interpreting
Blue Bell to mean that “when a company operates in an environment where externally 
imposed regulations govern its ‘mission critical’ operations, the board’s oversight function 
must be more rigorously exercised” (quoting Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 824)). 
113.  See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 813, 822. 
114.  See id. at 809, 813, 822. 
115. See, e.g., City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 55–56 
(Del. 2017) (emphasizing how difficult it is to prove bad faith and that the inferences made 
must be objectively reasonable). 
116. See Blue Bell, 212 A.3d at 821 (“[O]ur case law gives deference to boards and
has dismissed Caremark cases even when illegal or harmful company activities escaped 
detection, when the plaintiffs have been unable to plead that the board failed to make the 
required good faith effort to put a reasonable compliance and reporting system in place.”). 
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